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between the *objective* knowledge, which is given to us, and the *subjective* knowledge, which is *constructed by us*. Science is based entirely upon subjective knowledge: we accept definitions, and on this ground we build up science; but all our definitions are conventional, relative. We admit them as a result based upon a certain amount of facts, but we never know whether there are no other facts which perhaps might not correspond to the definition; and as we never know whether we have cognizance of all possible facts connected with an absolute definition, the result is that "no lurid mind will ever have the right to declare a hypothesis as definitive" ("Jamais un esprit éclairé n'aura le droit de déclarer une hypothèse définitive.") He attacks the positivist method on its own ground. He takes advantage of the concessions of Stuart Mill, in his "Philosophy of Hamilton," but pushes the theory to the very end. Not only must Mill be able to recognize that something entirely black may at the same time be white, and that a round object may perhaps be square, and that 2×2 are possibly 5, but in order to remain consistent, Mill has no right to hesitate in admitting that *A* may at the same time be *non A*.—Consequently, and that is the object of the whole demonstration, we can never condemn any theory on account of its relation with some other theory. Since we are the authors ourselves of our science, we have constructed it with elements invented by ourselves; and it may be perfectly possible that our science is wrong.

Mr. M. verifies his theory on mathematics, and applies it to moral liberty, the non-Euclidian geometry, and the solution of the antimonies of Kant by Mr. Renouvier.

I do not agree with the author in the conclusions he arrives at. If the theoretical scepticism he asserts has to be applied also in practical life—and it is the very reason for the theory, to save in that way moral liberty—I hardly see how science would be of any use to us. And yet if we may judge according to the past of science, there is no reason to doubt the practical value of the experimental and positive methods—no matter what the psychological origin of the method may be. However, it is a very interesting book, and one may derive great benefit in reading it.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(73) *L'individualité et l'erreur individualiste*. FÉLIX LE DANTEC. Alcan, Paris, 1898, pp. 175.

Within a few months this is the third book published by this author. It is not very surprising, therefore, that he takes up the largely the same topics not only in every book, but in the different chapters of each volume. We cannot expect from a scientist that he should collect each month matter enough to fill a new book. Mr. Le Dantec is a fighter, and since his physiologico-deterministic ideas were attacked sharply, he thinks it necessary to defend himself again. It seems to me that there was no reason for being surprised when, for instance, Catholic reviewers of his earlier books expressed views different from his own. Mr. Le Dantec is like so many writers of to-day who fail to recognize that the public consists of two classes of people: the scholars and the readers untrained in philosophy. I am sure that among the first class nobody would disagree with Mr. Le Dantec in his deterministic views; and if some do, it is only for reasons of sentiment, as the author says himself; they do not introduce the liberty, that is, the belief in an interruption of the strictly necessary sequence of causes and effects, within their scientific deductions. Whatever their conviction may be as to the existence of moral liberty, their

method of researches in physiology remains the same—and that is the important point.

However, one thing astonishes me, and that is that Mr. Le Dantec, in looking for names to give to the representatives of the two methods of investigation, he adopts that of *psychologists* for all those who refuse a sound scientific method. It would seem to me that, even if some ten or twenty years ago one had any right to classify in this manner in France, to-day it is entirely out of place in the country of Ribot, Pierre Janet, Binet, and other prominent psychologists, as well as in any other.

"Individualism" which he wishes to remove is hardly worth dwelling upon, since its manifest inanity has been recognized by every one. Not only does the *milieu* change from one moment to another, modifying our way of thinking, feeling and willing, but the individual himself who thinks, feels and wills is liable to change; physiological modifications of his being take place with him and influence his mode of psychical reaction; man is not like a stone which ever remains the same.

Let me point out an interesting discussion and successful refutation of the Archæsthetism of the late E. D. Cope of Philadelphia.

I need not to call attention to the lucid article on Physiological Senescence which appeared in the *Revue Philosophique* last year. Senescence is due to the outweighing of the muscular substance by the conjunctive or skeletal substance of the muscle.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(74) *Comment naissent les mythes*. PAUL REGNAUD. Alcan, Paris, 1898, 249 pages.

The sharp contest on the problem of the origin of myths continues. Our author takes his position midway between the philologists of the school of Max Müller, and, more recently, of Oldenberg in Germany, on the one hand, and on the other the psychologists, as Gaidoz in France and especially A. Lang, in England. Mr. Regnaud develops more fully the point of view of Bergaigne, which he had already accepted in his former publications.

The origin of the Indo-European mythology is found in the Vedāhs. Simple figures of speech (metaphors) in Vedic hymns were converted into realities or personifications. For instance, *agni*, the soul, before its development is accorded a very small place in the heart of man; it is considered as short as a thumb, thence the name of *poucet*, the little thumb. All the different features of the story, not only the name and the persons, but its very elements are explained in such way. In the Vedic hymns there is no story yet; the imagination only brought together the elements in them, and finally composed the myth of the little thumb.

The same explanation holds good in the case of the Deluge. The idea of such an event has its origin in the substitution of the legend which we all know, to a figurative description of the elements of sacrifice, when the religious act is about to take place or is actually performed.—And the same for other myths.

Any one who would hear such an explanation for the first time will find it hard to accept. However, after having conscientiously read the book of Mr. Regnaud to the end, it seems evident that there is a truth in this theory. But, on the other hand, the author seems to me unjust in his attitude towards the new school, and particularly towards its head, A. Lang. If in the myth here offered for consideration we might possibly agree with Mr. Regnaud, it does not result therefrom that that would be the case everywhere else. The psychological thesis, that the same myths found in dif-